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Milford Maambo and Others v The People 
2016/CC/R001 [2017] 
O’Brien Kaaba 
 
The Facts 
Three Applicants stood charged before the Livingstone Subordinate Court 
with twenty-five counts relating to corrupt practices under the Zambian 
Anti-Corruption Act No. 3 of 2012. When the matter came up for trial, the 
prosecutor presented a nolle prosequi to discontinue the criminal 
proceedings. The defence objected to the discontinuance of the proceedings 
in such a manner, arguing that the entry of the nolle prosequi did not meet 
the conditions set out in Article 180(4)(c) and (7) of the Constitution as 
amended, since no reasons were given to the Court for the discontinuation 
of proceedings. Consequently, the defence requested an interpretation of the 
impugned provisions by the Constitutional Court. 
 
The issue for determination was whether the Director of Public Prosecutions 
(DPP) still has unfettered powers to discontinue criminal proceedings pursuant 
to Articles 180(4)(c) and (7) of the Constitution, since the amendment of the 
Constitution by the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 2 of 2016. 
 
The Holding 
By a majority of four to one (Munalula JC dissenting), the Constitutional 
Court held that once the DPP informs the Court of his intention to 
discontinue proceedings pursuant to Article 180(4)(c), the Court cannot 
object to that exercise of power nor can it ask the DPP to furnish it with 
reasons for the discontinuation. Therefore, the DPP has unfettered discretion 
to discontinue criminal proceedings.  
 
Significance 
The judgment is significant in that it is the first application of Article 128 
(2): “where a question relating to this Constitution arises in a court, the 
person presiding in that court shall refer the question to the Constitutional 
Court.” That notwithstanding, the Constitutional Court’s decision is 
unsatisfactory for its defiance of the basic approaches in constitutional 
adjudication, and for its dearth in legal analysis, leaving one with the sense 
that a critical opportunity to expand constitutional law was lost.  
 
In determining how to interpret the Constitution, the Constitutional Court 
claimed to be restating the principles applicable in constitutional 
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interpretation in Zambia as well as in other jurisdictions. According to the 
Court, the correct approach is the literal rule of interpretation, which literal 
interpretation should only be vacated when it leads to an absurdity. This 
approach is, however, problematic. Judges are required to justify their 
decisions. As constitutional scholar Robert Post argues, “judges must be 
able to explain why they have decided to interpret the Constitution through 
one set of inquiries rather than another.”1 The reasons advanced by the 
Constitutional Court for choosing the literal rule have no merit and in fact, it 
is respectfully submitted, the use of the literal approach in constitutional 
adjudication is unconstitutional. 
 
The Constitution was, save for the Bill of Rights, overhauled in the 2016 
amendment. Article 1 of the Constitution declares the Constitution supreme. 
Therefore, any law or practice contradicting it is, to the extent of the 
inconsistency, invalid. Article 267(1) of the Constitution provides in 
mandatory terms how the Constitution shall be interpreted, stating that: 
This Constitution shall be interpreted in accordance with the Bill of Rights 
and in a manner that:- 
(a) Promotes its purpose, values and principles; 
(b) Permits the development of the law; and 
(c) Contributes to good governance. 
 
Further, Article 8 of the Constitution provides for national values, which 
include democracy and constitutionalism, social justice, good governance 
and integrity. Article 9 makes it mandatory for a court to apply these values 
in interpreting the Constitution and other laws. It must be noted that these 
provisions were borrowed from the 2010 Kenyan Constitution, word for 
word. The significance of these provisions, as the then Kenyan Chief Justice 
Willy Mutunga stated, is that “the Constitution is complete with its mode of 
its interpretation.”2 The Constitution being self-contained with tools for its 
interpretation, and these provisions being mandatory, there was no legal 
basis for the Constitutional Court’s reversion to the common law in order to 
circumvent the theory of interpretation required by the very Constitution. 
Surprisingly, the Constitutional Court seemed to be unaware of these 
                                                
1  Robert Post, (1990) “Theories of Constitutional Interpretation.” Yale Law 
Faculty Scholarship Series Paper 209. 
2  In the Matter of the Principles of Gender Representation in the National 
Assembly and Senate Advisory Opinion No. 2 of 2012. 
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provisions as nowhere in the majority judgment does the Court make 
reference to them. South African Constitutional Court Judge, Kentridge J, 
rightly stated that when a court ignores the language of the law giver, what 
results “is not interpretation but divination.”3 
 
Articles 8, 9 and 267 of the Constitution, which provide for its construction 
are value laden, entailing that constitutional interpretation is teleological 
and not mechanical. It should be geared towards realization of those 
constitutional values, standards and collective aspirations of the people. 
Invariably, only a purposive interpretation is consistent with this standard 
the Constitution has set for its interpretation. Contrary to the assertion of the 
Constitutional Court that the literal rule is the approach to interpretation 
taken in many jurisdictions, the purposive approach is actually the standard 
in countries with written constitutions.4 Former Judge of the South African 
Constitutional Court Mahomed J, considers a purposive and generous 
interpretation of the Constitution as an “international culture of 
constitutional jurisprudence.”5 This, as stated in a Namibian case, is the 
standard way of interpreting the constitution: 
 
A constitution is an organic document. Although it is enacted in the 
form of a statute it is sui generis. It must be broadly, liberally and 
purposively interpreted so as to avoid the austerity of tabulated 
legislation and so as to enable it to continue to play a creative and 
dynamic role in the expression and achievement of the ideals and 
aspirations of the nation, in the articulation of the values bonding its 
people and disciplining its government.6 
                                                
3  Zuma and Two Others v The State, Case No. CCT/5/94. 
4  See the following case examples: Affordable Medicines Trust and Others v The 
Minister of Health of the Republic of South Africa and Another, Case No. 
CCT/27/03; In the Matter of the Principle of Gender Representation in the 
National Assembly and Senate Advisory Opinion No. 2 of 2012; Democratic 
Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others (2016) ZACC 8; 
Economic Freedom Fighters v Speakers of the National Assembly and Others 
(2016) ZACC 11; State v Makwanyane and Mchunu, Case No. CCT/3/94; 
Mhlungu and Four Others v State , Case No. CCT/25/94; Republic of Namibia 
and Another v Cultura 2000 and Another 1994 (1) SA 407; Zuma and two others 
v The State, Case No. CCT/5/94. 
5  Mhlungu and Four Others v State, Case No. CCT/25/94. 
6  Government of the Republic of Namibia and Another v Cultura 2000 and 
Another 1994(1) SA 407. 
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In holding that the DPP enjoys absolute discretion in discontinuing criminal 
proceedings, the Court also relied on the legislative history of the provision. It 
noted that the first draft Constitution of 2012 had provisions that trammelled 
the discretion of the DPP, but that these provisions were removed in the final 
draft, and therefore, the framers of the Constitution never intended the DPP’s 
discretion to be constrained. Again, this approach is by itself, an impoverished 
approach to the determination of a constitutional matter. While understanding 
the decisions and choice of words used by framers of the Constitution is 
important in order to understand the larger context and meaning of specific 
words, that in itself should not be determinative of a constitutional issue. This 
is because, logically, the Constitution is not the product of the few individuals 
who framed it, but is, in the words of Mahomed AJ, “a mirror reflecting the 
national soul, the identification of the ideals and aspirations of a nation; the 
articulation of the values bonding its people.”7 A constitution, therefore, 
should not be interpreted simply to reflect its drafting history but to reflect the 
collective values and ideals of the people. Interpretation should be forward 
and not backwards looking. Chaskalson P, the former President of the South 
African Constitutional Court, once stated that a constitution should be 
interpreted as the product of a “multiplicity of persons” and therefore “caution 
is called for in respect of the comments of individual actors in the process, no 
matter how prominent a role they might have played.”8 The views of the 
Technical Committee that drafted the 2016 Constitution should, therefore, not 
have been determinative of the outcome of the Court’s decision. 
 
Taking a literal approach, the Court considered Article 180(4) (c) as giving 
the DPP unfettered discretion to discontinue criminal proceedings at any 
stage before judgment is delivered. In light of this approach, the Court has 
no oversight role to play in the manner in which the DPP exercises his/her 
discretion. In the view of the majority, this position is consistent with 
Article 180(7) which states that the DPP shall not be subject to the direction 
or control of a person or an authority in the discharge of his/her office. 
 
However, a careful reading of the Constitution shows no merit in this 
position. First, Article 180(7) has a qualification to the effect that in the 
discharge of his/her duty, the DPP “shall have regard to the public interest, 
administration of justice, the integrity of the judicial system and the need to 
avoid abuse of the legal process.” It is obvious that this qualification is a fetter 
                                                
7  The State v Achesou 1991(2) SA 805 (NM). 
8  The State v Makwanyane and Mchunu, Case No. CCT/3/94, para 18. 
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on the manner in which the DPP exercises discretion. If he/she contravenes 
these standards, he/she would be acting unconstitutionally. But not so for the 
Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court simply considered this 
qualification as a mere guide to the Director of Public Prosecutions “in the 
performance of the functions of that office.” The Court, however, gave no 
reasons for making that conclusion. The decision of the Constitutional Court 
is further contradicted by Article 267(4) which clearly states: 
 
A provision of this Constitution to the effect that a person, an authority 
or institution is not subject to the direction or control of a person or 
authority in the performance of a function, does not preclude a Court 
from exercising jurisdiction in relation to a question as to whether that 
person, authority or institution has performed the function in 
accordance with this Constitution or other laws. 
 
The net effect of Article 267(4) is that as long as the DPP derives his/her 
authority from the Constitution, the manner in which he/she exercises that 
power cannot escape the scrutiny of the Court as the guardian of the 
Constitution and the rule of law. The exercise of any power that issues 
under the Constitution is subject to constitutional control and judicial 
oversight. This is the standard approach in a constitutional democracy. 
Power is never arbitrary. As the South African Constitutional Court stated, 
where power derives from the constitution, its exercise must be “rationally 
related to the purpose for which power was given.”9 
 
Recent jurisprudence from the South African Supreme Court of Appeal is 
squarely in line with this view. On the powers of the DPP, the South African 
Constitution has comparable provisions to the Zambian Constitution. The 
South African National Prosecution Authority had, in 2009, dropped charges 
against President Zuma, and it was argued by the prosecution that this was 
within its discretion. The court rejected this argument. 
 
Finally, back to basics. The majority of the Constitutional Court held that 
the DPP has unfettered discretion to discontinue proceedings at any stage 
before judgment is delivered. But is “unfettered discretion” tenable in law? 
What exactly is discretion? Ronald Dworkin, addressed the concept of 
                                                
9  Affordable Medicines Trust and Others v The Minister of Health of the Republic 
of South Africa and Another, Case CCT/27/04. 
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discretion in his theory of adjudication.10 The word discretion is 
appropriately used in one context only, that is, when a person is in general 
charged with making decisions which are subject to standards set by a 
particular authority. As Dworkin states, “discretion, like the hole in a 
doughnut, does not exist except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of 
restriction.” Discretion therefore, at least in law, is always relative to the 
power under which it is given. Otherwise it does not exist. According to 
Dworkin, it is always legitimate to ask: “discretion under which standards?” 
or, “discretion as to which authority?” If, therefore, someone can do as they 
please, that is not discretion. It is simply lawlessness.  
 
                                                
10  Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Gerald Duckworth and Co, 
1986) 14-34. 
